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Shuffling to Justice 
WHY CHILDREN SHOULD NOT  
BE SHACKLED IN COURT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Her hands were secured tightly with metal handcuffs, 
and foot cuffs were clasped around her ankles.1 A leather belt 
was wrapped around her waist. This belt held metal rings that 
were linked to the handcuffs by a chain.2 This “restraint belt” 
prevented her from raising her hands above waist level.3 As her 
ankles were held closely together by the footcuffs, she had to 
shuffle in order to walk.4 Led by Office of Children’s and Family 
Services (“OCFS”) staff, she was made to shuffle through a 
waiting room filled with people, with the clanking of her metal 
chains heard by all.5 She is Jenny P., a fifteen-year-old girl  
who was adjudicated a delinquent in Kings County Family  
Court in Brooklyn.6 She was required to live and receive 
rehabilitative services at the Auburn Residential Center, a 
non-secure facility operated by OCFS.7 At Auburn, Jenny P. 
participated in field trips, she was on the Honor Roll, and she 
completed anger management and drug prevention programs.8 
She had never exhibited violent behavior during her trips to 
  
 1 This anecdote is taken from First Amended Complaint at 15, Jenny P. v. 
Johnson, No. 37784/2005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Complaint, Jenny 
P.], available at http://www.njdc.info/2006resourceguide/start.swf (follow “Advocacy in 
Juvenile Court” hyperlink; then follow “First Amended Complaint in Jenny P. v. 
Johnson” hyperlink under “B. Shackling”); Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Temporary Restraining Order 
at 13-16, No. 37784/2005 [hereinafter TRO Motion, Jenny P.], available at 
http://www.njdc.info/2006resourceguide/start.swf (follow “Advocacy in Juvenile Court” 
hyperlink; then follow “Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion” hyperlink under “B. 
Shackling”).  
 2 Complaint, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 5-6.  
 3 Id. at 6.  
 4 See id. at 15.  
 5 Id.  
 6 Id. at 7; TRO Motion, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 11.  
 7 TRO Motion, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 11.  
 8 Id. at 11-12.  
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court.9 Furthermore, the court did not determine that the 
restraints were necessary to prevent her from attempting to 
hurt someone or escaping the courtroom.10 In fact, no one had 
ever inquired as to Jenny P.’s mood or feelings each time she 
was brought to court and made to wait in a secure holding 
room while in shackles, or when she was brought in front of the 
judge wearing full restraints.11  
Jenny P.’s experience is not uncommon. In fact, until 
2005 when the Legal Aid Society brought a class action lawsuit 
challenging the blanket OCFS policy of shackling children, 
each child who was in OCFS custody was shackled for the 
duration of the time they were in court.12 One child was made 
to wait for nearly eight hours while fully shackled in a waiting 
room.13 Moreover, they were required to appear in front of the 
judge in footcuffs and a restraint belt, without any individ-
ualized determination of need.14 The practice of shackling 
children who are in the juvenile justice system is not isolated to 
New York. Indeed, at least twenty-eight states have courts that 
require juveniles to appear in shackles during juvenile court 
proceedings.15 Active litigation is challenging this practice in 
New York and Florida.16 However, in some courtrooms around 
the country, defenders’ motions for children to appear at 
proceedings free from restraints are routinely denied in the 
name of courtroom security.17 Judges in Florida recently denied 
such motions, explaining that they were not convinced by 
evidence showing that shackling may cause psychological 
damage and noting the importance of maintaining courtroom 
security.18 Thus, although some counties have been successful 
  
 9 Id. at 17. 
 10 Id. at 1. 
 11 Id. at 12-16.  
 12 Id. at 1. 
 13 Id. at 9. 
 14 Id. at 1, 5.  
 15 Martha T. Moore, Should Kids Go to Court in Chains?, USA TODAY.COM, 
June 18, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-06-17-
shackles_N.htm.  
 16 John F. v. Carrion, No. 07/407117 (NY. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12 2007) (on file with 
author) (The Jenny P. action was withdrawn and re-filed with the new named plaintiff 
John F.); infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.  
 17 See infra Part IV.A-B (discussing the extent of shackling practice and 
response of courts in select counties).  
 18 Kathleen Chapman, Judges Refuse to Unshackle Juveniles, PALM BEACH 
POST, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/Palm_Beach_Post-Judges_ 
refuse_to_unshackle_juveniles.pdf. In denying motions submitted by the Palm Beach 
County Office of the Public Defender to allow juveniles to appear in court free from 
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in challenging the routine use of shackles on juveniles, many 
children continue to be shackled each time they appear in 
juvenile court. The juvenile justice system has its historical 
roots in providing treatment instead of punishment.19 Shack-
ling thwarts the very purpose of this system by treating 
children like criminals.  
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that blanket 
policies that require all criminal defendants to appear in court 
while shackled are impermissible.20 However, the Court is 
silent on the applicability of this rule to juvenile court 
proceedings. Because there is no clear jurisprudence on when 
shackles may be used during juvenile court proceedings, state 
policies vary widely.21 While a handful of courts have held that 
juveniles may not be shackled without some showing of need, 
many others have failed to apply any standard.22 Therefore, 
thousands of children are required to endure the humiliation 
and physical pain of shackling even though they show no 
threat of danger or risk of flight.  
In this Note, I argue that routine and indiscriminate 
use of shackles on juveniles is contrary to the objectives of  
the juvenile justice system. The juvenile justice system was 
premised on the notion that juveniles need treatment and 
rehabilitation, and they should not be treated punitively like 
adults.23 Further, I argue that when children are required to 
appear in court in shackles for no justification, their sense of 
  
restraints, the panel of four judges concluded that “the public defender did not present 
satisfying evidence that the restraints can cause psychological damage and failed to 
consider court security.”  
 19 See infra Part III (discussing the purpose of the juvenile justice system). 
 20 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628-29 (2005).  
 21 See infra Part IV.A. 
 22 There have been numerous successful challenges to the routine and 
indiscriminate use of shackles on juveniles in state courts. See Tiffany A. v. Superior 
Court of L.A. County, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 373 (Ct. App. 2007) (stating that courts may 
not apply a blanket shackling policy without individualized determination of need);  
In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (finding error where a child was 
shackled without sufficient reason, such as to prevent escape or to ensure courtroom 
safety), aff’d, 364 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1977); State v. Merrell, 12 P.3d 556, 558 (Or. Ct. App. 
2000) (stating in a case involving a juvenile that a defendant may only be shackled 
when the court has determined that he poses a “serious risk of committing dangerous 
or disruptive behavior, or . . . a serious risk of escape”); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of 
Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that 
shackling a juvenile during a bench trial constituted constitutional error but that such 
error was harmless because there was no showing that the restraint was prejudicial). 
But see infra Part IV.A for examples of courts that have not applied the general rule 
from Deck to the shackling of juveniles.  
 23 See infra Part III.A. 
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fairness and justice is disrupted. The judicial system has an 
opportunity to educate children about justice and equality, but 
the routine use of shackles reinforces the notion that our 
justice system is unfair and inequitable. Further, it teaches 
children that they are not valued and respected. 
In Part II, I describe the legal standard for shackling in 
criminal court, including the Supreme Court decision Deck v. 
Missouri and the evolution of federal law applicable to 
shackling adult criminal defendants in court. Then, in Part III, 
I discuss the objectives of the juvenile court system, focusing on 
the system’s origins in treatment and rehabilitation rather 
than punishment. Part III concludes that a bargain was struck 
between the juvenile courts and children in the system to 
provide fewer procedural protections in exchange for a more 
rehabilitative and less punitive system. This bargain, I will 
argue, is repudiated through the practice of shackling children 
in court.  
In Part IV, I examine the extent to which courts require 
children to appear in shackles, the harms shackling causes to 
children, and the misguided justifications that are offered for 
requiring children to appear shackled in court. Finally, in  
Part V, I begin with an overview of the scant case law 
regarding shackling children in juvenile court. Then, I argue 
that the recent California Court of Appeal case Tiffany A. v. 
Superior Court sets forth a model analysis against routine 
shackling that recasts the demand to end indiscriminate 
shackling in terms of the distinct characteristics and needs of 
juveniles in the juvenile system. Instead of relying solely on the 
framework provided in Deck, juvenile courts should emphasize 
that shackling is distinctly harmful when applied to children 
because of the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile courts. I 
conclude by offering another reason to end the practice of 
routinely shackling children in court: when shackling juvenile 
defendants is limited to those rare situations when there is an 
individualized need, young people learn the values of a fair and 
just criminal justice system.  
II. SHACKLING AND THE LEGAL STANDARD IN CRIMINAL 
COURT 
The first court to speak on the issue of using shackles on 
a criminal defendant was the California Supreme Court in 
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1871.24 In People v. Harrington, the defendants had been 
convicted of robbery, and throughout their trial they had 
appeared in “irons.”25 The California Supreme Court denied the 
defendants’ request that they be tried without the shackles.26 
On appeal, the defendants argued that their common law 
rights were violated when they were tried while shackled.27 The 
California Supreme Court held that requiring the defendants 
to be tried in shackles without justification violated their 
rights.28 Furthermore, the court expressed some of the key 
concerns that the United States Supreme Court later relied 
upon when it ruled against the indiscriminate use of visible 
shackles on a defendant at trial and sentencing.29 These 
concerns were that shackles have a prejudicial effect and 
disrupt a defendant’s ability to adequately participate in his 
defense.30 While the Harrington court set down a clear rule on 
the use of shackles, most other courts remained silent on the 
issue until the twentieth century.31  
Today, the right of the accused to appear at trial free 
from the visible restraint of shackles has been upheld by 
numerous courts as a matter of state or federal law.32 The 
  
 24 People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165 (1871). 
 25 Id. at 166.  
 26 Id.  
 27 Id.  
 28 Id. at 168-69 (ruling on common law grounds, but noting that state 
constitutional rights might be implicated). 
 29 Compare id. at 168 with Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630-31 (2005); 
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). 
 30 The Harrington Court stated:  
[A]ny order or action of the Court which, without evident necessity, imposes 
physical burdens, pains and restraints upon a prisoner during the progress of 
his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his mental faculties, and 
thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights 
of defense; and especially would such physical bonds and restraints in like 
manner materially impair and prejudicially affect his statutory privilege of 
becoming a competent witness and testifying in his own behalf. 
42 Cal. at 168. 
 31 Deck, 544 U.S. at 641-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In 35 States, no 
recorded state-court decision on the issue appears until the 20th century. Of those 35 
States, 21 States have no recorded decision on the question until the 1950’s or later. 
The 14 state (including then-territorial) courts that addressed the matter before the 
20th century only began to do so in the 1870’s.”). 
 32 See generally Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial 
Effect of Gagging, Shackling, or Otherwise Physically Restraining Accused During 
Course of State Criminal Trial, 90 A.L.R. 3D 17 (1979) (discussing several state cases 
recognizing as a general rule an accused’s right to appear at trial free of shackles). For 
a list of lower court decisions upholding the right of defendants to appear free from 
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primary concern expressed regarding shackling at the guilt 
phase of a criminal trial is potential for prejudicing the jury.33 
Courts also note the impact shackling has on the accused’s 
ability to participate in his own defense and to communicate 
with his attorney, as well as the effect shackles have on the 
dignity and decorum of the courtroom.34 The Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on shackling has evolved through three main 
cases: Illinois v. Allen, Holbrook v. Flynn, and Deck v. 
Missouri.35  
A.  Illinois v. Allen (1970) 
In Illinois v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that the use 
of shackles, binds, or gags on a defendant who is unwilling to 
behave appropriately at trial may be necessary, but that these 
techniques may only be used as a last resort.36 In Allen, the 
defendant was convicted of armed robbery when he stole $200 
at gunpoint from a bartender.37 At trial, Allen demanded that 
he act as his own attorney, and the trial judge allowed him to 
represent himself until he began to act in a hostile and defiant 
manner.38 During voir dire Allen repeatedly ignored the judge’s 
warnings that he must behave while in court. After Allen 
refused to cooperate, made statements threatening the judge’s 
life, and insisted that “there would be no trial,” the trial judge 
removed Allen for part of the proceedings.39 Allen was allowed 
to return to the proceedings after he agreed to behave properly, 
  
visible restraint, but allowing the right to be overcome by essential state interests such 
as courtroom security or escape prevention, see Deck, 544 U.S. at 628-29.  
 33 Deck, 544 U.S. at 630 (detailing the prejudicial effect of visible shackles). 
“Visible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of 
the factfinding process.” Id.  
 34 See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 17. 
 35 See generally Deck, 544 U.S. 622 (holding that the prohibition on visible 
restraints without a showing of an essential state interest applies with equal force to 
the penalty phase of a capital trial as it does to the guilt phase); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 
U.S. 560 (1986) (holding that the presence of security guards was not so prejudicial as 
to deny the defendant’s right to a fair trial); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) 
(finding that shackles should only be used as a last resort).  
 36 Allen, 397 U.S. at 343-44.  
 37 Id. at 338-39. 
 38 Id. at 339-41.  
 39 Id. at 340. During one of Allen’s outbursts, he stated, “When I go out for 
lunchtime, you’re [the judge] going to be a corpse here.” Id. (quoting United States ex 
rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 233 (7th Cir.1969), rev’d on other grounds, Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)).  
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but he made another outburst and was again removed from the 
courtroom.40  
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court attempted to 
strike a balance between upholding a defendant’s constitu-
tional rights and maintaining safety and the appropriate 
administration of criminal proceedings. The Court set forth 
three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to 
handle a defiant defendant: “(1) bind and gag him, thereby 
keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; [and] (3) take 
him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself 
properly.”41 While the Court acknowledged that circumstances 
may exist that permit the use of shackles or physical restraints 
on a defendant, it took pains to emphasize that the use of 
shackles should be severely limited, declaring that shackles 
and gags should only be used as a “last resort.”42 The Court 
further noted that the “sight of shackles and gags”43 might 
impact the jury’s feelings about the defendant, may impair the 
defendant’s ability to communicate with his attorney, and is 
generally an “affront to the very dignity and decorum of 
judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.”44 
Thus, Allen stands for the proposition that requiring a 
defendant to appear in court in visible physical restraints is an 
offense to a fair and impartial criminal justice system, and 
must only be used as an absolute last resort.  
B.  Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 
Sixteen years later, the United States Supreme Court 
considered the presence of uniformed guards at a defendant’s 
trial in comparison to visible shackles. In Holbrook v. Flynn, 
  
 40 Id. at 340-41. Shortly after the trial judge warned Allen that if he 
continued to make outbursts he would be removed from the courtroom, Allen 
announced, “There is going to be no proceeding. I’m going to start talking and I’m going 
to keep on talking all through the trial. There’s not going to be no trial like this. I want 
my sister and friends here in court to testify for me.” Allen, 413 F.2d, at 234.  
 41 Id. at 343-44. 
 42 Id. at 344. The Court stated, “But even to contemplate such a technique [to 
bind and gag], much less see it, arouses a feeling that no person should be tried while 
shackled and gagged except as a last resort.” Id.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id.; see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505-06 (1976) (finding that 
requiring a criminal defendant to wear prison clothing during his trial violated his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law). The Court noted that 
“no essential state policy” is furthered by this requirement. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505. 
The Court nonetheless upheld the conviction because the defendant failed to make an 
objection to the trial court. Id. at 512-13.  
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the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s constitutional 
right to a fair trial was not violated when, during the trial, four 
uniformed state troopers in addition to the regular courtroom 
security officers sat in the front row of the courtroom.45 The 
Court distinguished this case from Estelle v. Williams46 and 
Allen, concluding that physical restraints and prison clothing 
are significantly different from the sight of uniformed police 
officers at a trial.47 The Court maintained that “shackling and 
prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the need to 
separate a defendant from the community at large.”48 In 
contrast, the Court stated that “the presence of guards at a 
defendant’s trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he is 
particularly dangerous or culpable.”49 Furthermore, the Court 
compared the sight of uniformed security within a courtroom to 
visible shackles and concluded that uniformed security was not 
so “inherently prejudicial” to the defendant that it must comply 
with the legal standard for shackling and therefore be “justified 
by an essential state interest specific to each trial.”50 Thus, the 
Court suggested a hierarchy where shackling stood above other 
potential marks of criminality as particularly suggestive and 
insidious.  
C.  Deck v. Missouri (2005) 
Most recently, the Supreme Court rejected the use of 
visible shackles on an adult defendant during the sentencing 
phase of a criminal trial. In 1998, Carmen Deck was convicted 
of the robbery and murder of an elderly couple in their home.51 
Throughout Deck’s sentencing proceedings, he was shackled 
with leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain.52 Deck’s attorney 
objected to the use of shackles several times during the 
  
 45 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1986). 
 46 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 47 Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569.  
 48 Id.  
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 568-69. The Court concluded that even if prejudice could be found in 
allowing the uniformed security force to remain at the trial, the prejudice could be 
outweighed by the “State’s legitimate interest in maintaining custody during the 
proceedings . . . .” Id. at 571-72. Cf. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505-06 (concluding that 
requiring a defendant to wear prison clothing during trial does not promote any 
legitimate state interest).  
 51 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624-25 (2005). 
 52 Id. at 625. 
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proceedings, but his motions were repeatedly overruled.53 Deck 
remained shackled throughout the sentencing proceedings and 
was condemned to death.54 Deck appealed his sentence on the 
grounds that his shackling violated Missouri law as well as the 
U.S. Constitution.55 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed 
Deck’s sentence, concluding that first, the record did not reflect 
that the jury saw or was aware of the shackles; second, Deck 
did not argue that the shackles prevented him from 
communicating with his attorney; and lastly, because Deck was 
a repeat offender, there was evidence that he was a flight risk.56  
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court stated 
that the law had prohibited visible shackles during the guilt 
phase of a criminal trial for many years.57 In Deck, the Court 
extended this rule and held that this prohibition against 
shackles at a criminal trial included the sentencing phases of a 
defendant in a capital case.58 Accordingly, a state may only 
shackle a criminal defendant when there is an “essential state 
interest.”59 The majority opinion in Deck relied on prior case 
law to set forth three guiding principles regarding the use  
of shackles on criminal defendants.60 First, visible shackles  
are “inherently prejudicial;”61 second, shackles may disrupt a 
  
 53 Id. The majority noted that the defendant’s attorney objected prior to, 
during, and after jury voir dire, arguing that the jury was prejudiced by seeing the 
defendant in shackles. Id. The sentencing court disagreed, noting that by keeping the 
defendant in shackles the jury was relieved of any fear. Id.  
 54 Id. (citing State v. Deck, 136 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Mo. 2004) (en banc), rev’d on 
other grounds, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005)). Deck remained in shackles 
throughout his trial, though the shackles were not visible to the jury. Id. at 624. He 
was convicted and sentenced to death. However, at the conclusion of the trial, the 
Missouri Supreme Court, upholding the conviction, set aside the sentence, thus leading 
to the new sentencing proceeding. Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 432 (Mo. 2002) (en 
banc), aff’d, 136 S.W.3d 481 (Mo. 2004), rev’d, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005). 
 55 Deck, 544 U.S. at 625. 
 56 State v. Deck, 136 S.W.3d at 485-86. 
 57 Deck, 544 U.S. at 626. 
 58 Id. at 633. But see Brandon Dickerson, Casenote, Bidding Farewell to the 
Ball and Chain: The United States Supreme Court Unconvincingly Prohibits Shackling 
in the Penalty Phase in Deck v. Missouri, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 741, 743 (2006) 
(arguing that the rule against visible shackling should not apply with equal force to the 
sentencing phase and that the holding in Deck was based on “unconvincing reasoning 
and unpersuasive dicta”).  
 59 Deck, 544 U.S. at 628 (citing “physical security, escape prevention, or 
courtroom decorum” as examples of such essential interests).  
 60 The Court in Deck outlined the holdings in Holbrook, Allen, and Estelle 
prior to setting forth the general rule that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibit the use of visible shackles “absent a trial court determination . . . that they are 
justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” Id. at 627-29.  
 61 Id. at 628 (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986)). 
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defendant’s ability to communicate with his counsel; and lastly, 
shackles undermine the appearance of dignity in the courtroom 
and jeopardize the tenet of innocent until proven guilty.62  
The Supreme Court reflected on both legal history and 
the practice of the majority of lower courts to support its 
reasoning for prohibiting the use of visible shackles during the 
sentencing phase of a defendant’s trial absent an essential 
state interest. As the majority in Deck opined, the general 
prohibition against visible shackles at trial is rooted in the 
English common law rules.63 During the eighteenth century, 
William Blackstone wrote that “the defendant must be brought 
to the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; 
unless there be evident danger of an escape.”64 The Court 
acknowledged that most trial courts have treaded close to this 
standard. Moreover, the Court maintained that while lower 
courts have differed on the procedures used to govern the 
standard for shackling, they have adhered to the rule that, 
barring a particular reason, the routine use of visible shackles 
on defendants is unauthorized.65 Additionally, the Deck court 
reasoned that this standard was embedded in the U.S. 
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of 
due process.66  
In sum, the Supreme Court has been entirely clear  
that blanket policies requiring shackles on all defendants  
are impermissible. Furthermore, the Court has expressed 
unquestionable concern that visible shackles are prejudicial 
and should only be used as a last resort. Moreover, the Court 
recognized the significant impact shackles may have on the 
  
 62 Id. at 631; see also Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 
337, 344; People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871).  
 63 Deck, 544 U.S. at 626. 
 64 Id. (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
317 (1769)). However, the Court acknowledged that the primary reason the common 
law rule against shackles existed was to prevent physical harm to the defendant, and 
in modern times physical harm is no longer a major concern. Id. at 630. Justice 
Thomas’ dissent emphasizes this distinction between the justifications for the common 
law rule and the modern principle on shackling to argue that the modern rule has no 
resemblance to the original concerns about shackling. Id. at 635-40 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). Furthermore, Thomas argues that the modern restraints are not physically 
harmful and do not interfere with a defendant’s ability to defend himself at trial, the 
paramount concerns during the common law days. Id. at 640. Therefore, Thomas 
argues that the Court errs in equating modern day restraints with those used at the 
time of common law and sets forth a standard that has no historical basis. Id. at 640-
41. This Note argues that physical harm is still a concern with shackling children. See 
infra Part IV.C.  
 65 Deck, 544 U.S. at 628.  
 66 Id. at 627.  
2008] SHUFFLING TO JUSTICE 1559 
dignity of the courtroom and the ability of the defendant to 
communicate with counsel. Finally, in Deck, the Court took 
notice that the lower courts have treated the case law from 
Holbrook and Allen as declaring a constitutional standard 
prohibiting the use of visible shackles unless there is an 
apparent risk of danger or flight.67 For a variety of reasons, 
which will be discussed in this Note, these standards are not 
currently fully applied in juvenile cases.  
III. OBJECTIVES OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The juvenile justice system is premised upon the notion 
of treatment and rehabilitation instead of punishment, with an 
emphasis on individualized evaluations.68 While a shift over the 
past two decades toward a focus on accountability has 
permeated the juvenile court system, the underlying purpose of 
rehabilitation has never completely disappeared.  
A.  History of the Juvenile Court 
A review of the history of the juvenile court is necessary 
for understanding the principles that guided the juvenile 
justice system. Further, the historical background reinforces 
how shackling children in court undermines the goals of the 
juvenile justice system. The first juvenile court was established 
in Cook County, Illinois in 1899 in response to growing 
concerns that children who violated the law were being treated 
far too punitively.69 Social reformers believed children should 
not be put through the criminal justice system in the same 
fashion as adults.70 Moreover, the reformers did not believe 
  
 67 Id. at 629 (finding lower courts “have disagreed about the specific pro-
cedural steps a trial court must take prior to shackling, about the amount and type of 
evidence needed to justify restraints, and about what forms of prejudice might warrant 
a new trial, but they have not questioned the basic principle. They have emphasized 
the importance of preserving trial court discretion . . . but they have applied the limits 
on that discretion described in Holbrook, Allen, and the early English cases”).  
 68 See generally OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 12 (2005) (explaining the history of the juvenile justice 
system and the focus on rehabilitation and individualized justice); Julian W. Mack, The 
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909). 
 69 IRA SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 150-51 (1989). 
 70 Id. at 150. The whole notion of setting up a separate court for juveniles is 
akin to accepting the proposition that children are developmentally different from 
adults and therefore have different needs. The differences between children and adults 
continue to be the subject of research. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS 
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children should have to face punishment and jail as a response 
to their transgressions from the law.71 Instead, they decided to 
create a special court for children based on a “rehabilitative 
ideal.”72 As a result, the Illinois court focused on treatment and 
rehabilitation of youths, promoting the best interests of the 
child.73 Therefore, the judge explored children’s social and 
emotional needs and attempted to provide services that would 
help “save” the child.74 In exchange, due process considerations 
and traditional adversarial proceedings were bypassed.75  
In the two decades following the Illinois court, almost 
all states created special courts for children.76 The parens 
patriae77 concept provided the legal foundation for the juvenile 
court system. Accordingly, the judge sat as a father figure and 
provided guidance to the wayward youth. Thus, these courts 
  
WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 45-51 (2005) (discussing in detail the cognitive and psychosocial 
differences between adults and children, including research on differences in brain 
development suggesting that adolescents have a less-developed sense of impulse 
control). Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of capital 
punishment on individuals under age eighteen was prohibited by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). In so doing, the 
Court recognized that children are developmentally and emotionally different from 
adults, less responsible for their actions, and more capable of change. See id. at 569-70. 
 71 The Progressives were a group of reformers who tackled concerns such as 
women’s suffrage and child labor, along with the issue of juvenile offenders. See 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 150. Their reforms came as a result of social problems 
they saw as reflecting the changes from the Industrial Revolution. See id. The thought 
behind the transformation in the juvenile court system was that juvenile offenders 
should be treated like abused and neglected children and the state should serve to 
protect these children. Mack, supra note 68, at 107. 
 72 SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 150. 
 73 Id. at 150-51. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the early 
juvenile courts, see generally David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in 
the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A 
CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 42-73 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).  
 74 Mack, supra note 68, at 108-10 (noting that numerous states followed the 
Illinois example to establish new juvenile court laws); see also ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE 
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3-4 (1969). In contrast to this new 
juvenile system, the adult criminal system was adversarial in nature. The adult system 
focused on punishment and jail as a response to crime. Notions of treatment and 
rehabilitation were not recognized in the adult system. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, 
at 150. 
 75 See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology, 
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 11 
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Mack, supra note 68, at 109-10.  
 76 SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 151 (citing W. WADLINGTON ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 198 (1983)).  
 77 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1966). In Gault, Justice Fortas noted that 
parens patriae is a Latin phrase “taken from chancery practice, where . . . it was used 
to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting 
the property interests and the person of the child. But there is no trace of the doctrine 
in the history of criminal jurisprudence.” Id.  
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espoused the principle that children, regardless of their status 
as dependent, neglected, or delinquent most importantly 
needed “state supervision in the manner of a wise and devoted 
parent.”78 Additionally, the reformers and these special courts 
for children pioneered the notion of “individualized justice,” 
where courts focused on each child’s characteristics, back-
ground, and needs, and determined an appropriate treatment 
plan to heal the child and enable him to participate in society.79 
The system was intended to be informal.80 By crafting a system 
that viewed children’s transgressions as something to be 
treated as opposed to something worthy of punishment, there 
was a justification in denying children the due process rights 
and procedural safeguards that were the hallmark of the adult 
criminal court system.81 
Beginning in 1966, after nearly sixty years, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to review this system, and 
over the next five years, it handed down several decisions that 
forever changed the landscape of juvenile justice in America. 
Questioning the “naïve arrogance of the rehabilitative ideal,”82 
the Court declared that “juveniles are entitled to a broad range 
of procedural protections previously denied them.”83 Thus, the 
initial phase of the juvenile court and its protectionist, “child-
saving” mentality came to a close. However, in the decades 
following the Supreme Court’s decision to provide juveniles 
with certain procedural safeguards, the values propounded by 
the social reformers continued to inform the emerging juvenile 
justice system.84  
  
 78 ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA’S JUVENILE COURT 
EXPERIMENT 42 (1978).  
 79 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
CASES 12 (2005).  
 80 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 151; see also, Barry C. Feld, 
Criminalizing the Juvenile Court: A Research Agenda for the 1990’s, in JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 59, 60-61 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992).  
 81 SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 151. Schwartz comments:  
The creators of the juvenile court envisioned that this special court for 
children would be less like a court and more like a social welfare agency. 
Children who were brought to the attention of the juvenile court were to be 
helped rather than punished . . . . In exchange for this informality, they were 
denied the rights and procedural safeguards accorded to adults.  
Id. 
 82 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 33 (2005).  
 83 SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 151. 
 84 See infra Part III.B. The Supreme Court in Gault emphasized that there 
need not be a conflict between providing due process rights and the vision of a 
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B. The Emergence of Due Process Rights  
By granting certain due process rights to juveniles, the 
Supreme Court sought to ensure that this population was 
treated fairly in the juvenile court system.85 Despite the 
benevolent goals of the social reformers, the informal juvenile 
court system was not working.86 The Supreme Court first 
confronted the problems of the juvenile court system in Kent v. 
United States.87 Kent was the first of four landmark juvenile 
justice cases that permanently altered the way juveniles were 
treated in the legal system.88 In Kent, the Court addressed the 
issue of waiver of jurisdiction89 from juvenile to adult court.90 
The Court held that waiver of jurisdiction was a “critically 
important action determining vitally important statutory 
rights of the juvenile” and therefore required a statement of 
  
rehabilitative court system for juveniles. 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). But see Feld, supra note 
80, at 62. Feld points out that despite the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
legislative and judicial reforms have largely left juveniles with little of the protections 
the social reformers had in mind. See id. 
 85 See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-54 (1966) (holding that 
transfer proceedings must comport with basic standards of due process and fair 
treatment, while acknowledging the therapeutic nature of the juvenile court). But see 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 159 (“The informality and confidentiality of juvenile court 
proceedings and the broad discretion given to judges and other professionals working 
in the court contributed to widespread abuses . . . . The situation is tantamount to 
sacrificing the civil liberties of children in exchange for ‘good intentions.’”). 
 86 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1971) (“[T]he fond and 
idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three 
generations ago have not been realized.”).  
 87 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 541.  
 88 The four landmark cases are McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528, In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358 (1970), In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, and Kent, 383 U.S. 541.  
 89 Waiver of jurisdiction refers to the process by which a juvenile court may 
decline to maintain jurisdiction of a juvenile court case and then transfer the case to 
adult court. See Campaign for Youth Justice, Fact Sheet: Trying Youth as Adults, at 2, 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/fact_sheets.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
States’ waiver policies and proceedings vary. Id. at 2-3. 
 90 Kent involved the prosecution of a 16 year old for housebreaking, robbery 
and rape. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543-44. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
convicted Kent of housebreaking and robbery. Id. at 550. Kent appealed, and the 
judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. See Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 261 (1964), rev’d, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
At trial, Kent’s attorney filed a motion for a hearing on the issue of waiver of Juvenile 
Court jurisdiction along with an affidavit from a psychiatrist that recommended Kent 
receive psychiatric treatment due to “severe psychopathology.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 545. 
Kent’s attorney also filed a motion with the Juvenile Court to gain access to his client’s 
social service filed arguing that access to the file was “essential to his providing 
petitioner with effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 546. The Juvenile Court judge did 
not rule on the motions and declined to hold a hearing on waiver. Id. Instead he 
ordered Kent to be tried in adult court stating that “after ‘full investigation, I do hereby 
waive’ jurisdiction of petitioner . . . .” Id. 
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reasons or considerations before a judge’s waiver of juvenile 
jurisdiction.91 Additionally, the Court held that a juvenile is 
entitled to counsel during the waiver proceeding and that 
counsel must have a meaningful opportunity to participate in 
the proceedings.92 While the Court’s holding in Kent empha-
sized the need for procedural safeguards in waiver proceedings, 
the Court continued to acknowledge the therapeutic nature of 
juvenile court. As the Court explained:  
The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the 
needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal 
conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and 
rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix 
criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens 
patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge. But the 
admonition to function in a “parental” relationship is not an 
invitation to procedural arbitrariness.93 
Thus, the Court expressed concern that juvenile proceedings, 
while purporting to care for and attend to children’s needs, 
actually do more harm than good. Justice Fortas ominously 
predicted, “there may be grounds for concern that the child 
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the 
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and 
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”94  
The holding in Kent paved the way for the 1967 decision 
In re Gault, the seminal case in juvenile jurisprudence, which 
held that due process protections must be extended to juvenile 
  
 91 Kent, 383 U.S. at 556. The Court noted that while the statement need not 
be “formal” or include “conventional findings of fact,” it must show that the statutory 
requirement of a “full investigation” was met and “must set forth the basis for the order 
with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.” Id. at 561. 
 92 Id. at 561. A meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceeding 
requires, for example, that counsel has access to the child’s social records. Id.  
 93 Id. at 554-55. But, in the opinion, Justice Fortas also insisted that the 
holding did not require that the “hearing to be held must conform with all of the 
requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing.” Id. at 
562.  
 94 Id. at 556. See generally Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the 
Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7 (1965) 
(critiquing the goals of both the original reformers, who sought to eliminate the 
adversary system, and the current reformers, who argue for more procedural 
protections and propose a system that introduces procedures at the administrative 
level with the opportunity for judicial oversight); David R. Barrett, William J. T. 
Brown, & John M. Cramer, Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and 
Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966) (noting the criticism of the juvenile 
courts and the concern that children may be “relinquish[ing] too many . . . rights in 
exchange for an unfulfilled promise of treatment rather than punishment”). 
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delinquency proceedings.95 These protections included the 
rights to formal notice, appointed counsel, confrontation,  
and cross-examination as well as the privilege against self-
incrimination.96 In Gault, the Court drew a sharp distinction 
between providing children with “careful, compassionate,  
and individualized treatment,” and relaxed procedures that 
deprive juveniles of key fundamental rights.97 Indeed the  
Court declared, “[U]nbridled discretion, however benevolently 
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and 
procedure.”98  
Although Gault signified a shift in the approach of the 
juvenile court system by providing youth with key procedural 
safeguards, Gault did not, nevertheless, reject the rehabili-
tative model that provided the legal underpinnings of the 
juvenile court.99 Gault did not suggest that the rehabilitative 
model was inappropriate; rather, it contended that the system 
had gone awry.100 The oft-cited quote from Justice Fortas 
emphasizes this point. He famously remarked, “[T]he condition 
of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”101 Indeed, the 
Gault Court insisted, “the observance of due process standards, 
intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel 
the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive 
benefits for the juvenile process.”102  
Three years later, the Court held that every element of 
a juvenile delinquency case must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt in In re Winship.103 However, a year later the Court 
stopped short of guaranteeing juveniles the full protections 
  
 95 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1967). Gault involved a fifteen-year-old boy 
accused of making a lewd phone call to his neighbor. Id. at 4. 
 96 Id. at 33-34, 41, 55-57. 
 97 Id. at 18-19.  
 98 Id. at 18.  
 99 Id. at 21-22. But see ZIMRING, supra note 82, at 40-41 (offering an opposing 
view that Gault and Winship reflect a departure from traditional juvenile court 
jurisprudence). Zimring argues that if the purpose of the juvenile court is to intervene 
for the child’s best interests, then the procedural safeguards introduced in Gault and 
Winship pose a barrier to such aggressive intervention. Id. Furthermore, he argues 
that providing procedural safeguards reflects a “diversionary justification” of the court, 
in which the primary goal is diverting juveniles from the harsh results of the adult 
criminal system. Id. at 35.  
 100 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21-22.  
 101 Id. at 28.  
 102 Id. at 21.  
 103 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (emphasizing again that “the observance of the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt ‘will not compel the States to abandon or 
displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process’” (citing In re Gault, 387 
U.S. at 21)).  
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afforded adults when it held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania that 
there is no constitutional right to a jury in juvenile court 
proceedings.104 Returning to the rehabilitative and thera- 
peutic underpinnings of the juvenile court system, the Court 
concluded that a jury trial, “if required as a matter of 
constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceedings 
into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to 
what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal 
protective proceeding.”105  
By the early 1970s, the Court made a subtle return to 
the original basis of the juvenile court system: to support, 
protect, and foster rehabilitation in youth charged with 
violating the law.106 The Court acknowledged the importance of 
striking a “judicious balance” between providing procedural 
safeguards in the juvenile court system and ensuring that the 
system remains informal and focuses on rehabilitation rather 
than punishment.107 In sum, the Court attempted to make a 
bargain with children: courts would forego a fully adversarial 
system complete with the full panoply of due process rights 
afforded to defendants in the adult system, while in exchange 
children would experience a court system that focused on their 
unique backgrounds and needs. Moreover, the system would 
continue to reject punishment in exchange for rehabilitative 
services that assisted juveniles in restoring their lives.108  
  
 104 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).  
 105 Id. The Court emphasized that the “fond and idealistic hopes of the 
juvenile court proponents and early reformers . . . have not been realized.” Id. at 543-
44. However, the Court blamed the failures of the system on “[t]he community’s 
unwillingness to provide people and facilities and to be concerned, the insufficiency of 
time devoted, the scarcity of professional help, the inadequacy of dispositional 
alternatives, and our general lack of knowledge . . . .” Id. at 544.  
 106 Many critics of McKeiver argue that although the court stated that denying 
juveniles the constitutional right to a jury trial was because the system should be 
informal since the purpose was to “help” children, in reality the system was already 
turning punitive and denying juveniles the right to a jury trial only served to penalize 
them. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: 
Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in 
Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1144-45, 1154 (2003). Furthermore, 
much of the criticism of McKeiver hinges on the fact that juveniles do not have a right 
to a jury trial, but through state and federal law, their juvenile adjudications may be 
used against them for the purposes of a sentencing enhancement in adult criminal 
court. See, e.g., id. at 1155 n.144 (citing numerous articles that are critical of 
McKeiver). 
 107 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 234 A.2d 9, 
15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)). 
 108 One author has used the analogy that a “deal” was struck between juvenile 
defendants and the State to provide juveniles with rehabilitation in exchange for 
sacrificing certain due process rights. Douglas M. Schneider, But I was Just a Kid!: 
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IV. SHACKLING AND THE REPUDIATION OF A BARGAIN 
The routine and indiscriminate use of shackles on 
juveniles violates the bargain courts struck with children in the 
juvenile justice system—that in exchange for fewer procedural 
protections, juveniles would be offered treatment and rehab-
ilitative services.109 Therefore, the primary objective of the 
juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate youth. However, 
shackles run directly contrary to this goal. Shackles affect a 
juvenile’s sense of right and wrong; cause physical and 
psychological harm, stigma, and embarrassment; foster a sense 
of distrust for the justice system; and teach children that  
  
Does Using Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences Run Afoul of Apprendi 
v. New Jersey?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 840 (2005); see also Commonwealth v. Fisher, 
62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905) (holding that in order to “save a child from becoming a 
criminal” the Legislature may bring the child to court “without any process at all, for 
the purpose of subjecting it to the state’s guardianship and protection”). One of the 
hallmarks of the juvenile court system is the flexible array of services available to 
family court judges when adjudicating delinquent juveniles. Instead of only probation 
or incarceration, which are so often the only choices in adult court, juvenile court 
judges may choose from a variety of community based and alternative to incarceration 
programs, along with residential treatment programs and secure detention facilities. 
See MICHAEL A. CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN: A PROPOSAL FOR A 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 132-35 (2006). Unfortunately, many scholars conclude that 
despite intervention from the U.S. Supreme Court, the modern juvenile justice system 
was and continues to be a failure. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 80, at 75-76 (discussing the 
deplorable conditions of juvenile confinement historically and today as an example of 
the juvenile court’s illusory commitment to rehabilitation).  
 109  Shackling is not the only practice that reflects a repudiation of the bargain 
with juveniles to provide a less punitive system in exchange for depriving them of the 
full panoply of due process rights. Indeed, beginning in the 1990s, there was a major 
shift in the juvenile justice system toward a more punitive system. Referring to the 
“criminalizing of the juvenile court,” Barry Feld argues that four key developments led 
to a tightening of the juvenile justice system and an emphasis on punishment and just 
deserts. Feld, supra note 80, at 62. Those developments were the “removal of status 
offenders [from juvenile jurisdiction], waiver of serious offenders to the adult system, 
increased punitiveness, and procedural formality.” Id. Other indications that the 
juvenile justice system became more punitive are legislative initiatives in the 1990s 
implemented to criminalize youth and their offenses, the increase in juvenile 
placement to residential facilities, and the increase in the number of delinquency cases 
that were transferred to criminal courts. David R. Katner, The Mental Health 
Paradigm and the MacArthur Study: Emerging Issues Challenging the Competence of 
Juveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 503, 504 (2006); see also 
ZIMRING, supra note 82, at 44-47; Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for 
Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 415-18 (2003); Randall 
T. Salekin et al., Juvenile Transfer to Adult Courts: A Look at the Prototypes for 
Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and Amenability to Treatment Through a 
Legal Lens, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 373, 373-74 (2002); Schneider, supra note 108, 
at 840 (arguing that the use of a juvenile adjudication as a prior offense for purposes of 
a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act violates the “deal” 
that was struck between juveniles and the State to provide juveniles with 
rehabilitation in exchange for certain procedural rights). 
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they will be treated like criminals.110 In this section, I begin 
with a discussion of the extent to which courts require children 
to appear in shackles. Next, I will address the justifications 
offered for shackling and explain why these justifications 
neither represent essential interests significant enough to 
merit shackling juveniles nor outweigh the detrimental effects 
shackling has on juveniles. Then, I will examine the physical 
and psychological harms shackles cause to children. Finally, I 
will briefly examine the right to treatment afforded to children 
in rehabilitative facilities, why this right should apply with 
equal force when children are going through juvenile court 
proceedings, and how shackling children violates this right to 
treatment.  
A.  Shackling: Extent of the Practice 
While litigation on shackling is sparse, reports from 
local courtrooms around the country indicate that shackling is 
a pervasive practice in juvenile court proceedings.111 In twenty 
eight states, some juvenile courts routinely require juveniles to 
remain in shackles throughout their court proceedings.112 
Anecdotal evidence from juvenile defenders around the country 
provides examples of the routine use of shackles on juveniles. A 
survey of defender offices in Florida revealed that in some 
counties, the practice of requiring children to wear shackles 
during juvenile court proceedings has persisted for over twenty 
years. While in other counties the practice is relatively new, 
and courts have implemented the system of shackling children 
over the past five years.113 Additionally, the Director of Juvenile 
  
 110 See infra Part IV.C.  
 111 Through the assistance of Bob Boruchowitz, Visiting Clinical Professor of 
Law at Seattle University Law School, I submitted a brief survey with seven questions 
on shackling practices to the American Council of Chief Defenders ListServe. The 
seven questions asked were (1) Does the courtroom where you practice shackle 
juveniles? (2) What, if any, criteria are used to determine whether a juvenile should be 
shackled? (3) Does your courtroom use “restraint boxes” or “restraint belts” on 
juveniles? (4) Do any of the state run programs (detention/treatment) require juveniles 
remain in shackles while they are waiting for their court appearances? (5) If yes, are 
the shackles removed once the juvenile is in front of the judge? (6) What, if any, types 
of arguments have you made in opposition to the use of shackles on juveniles you 
represented in court? (7) What has the court ruled? Finally, we also asked respondents 
to share any copies of pleadings and of the court’s rulings. The survey produced a small 
number of responses, not sufficient to draw systemic conclusions, but consistent with 
observations reflected in news articles and cases discussed in this Note.  
 112 Moore, supra note 15, at 1A. 
 113 Carlos Martinez, Why Are Children in Florida Treated as Enemy Combat-
ants? CORNERSTONE, May-Aug. 2007, at 10-11, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ 
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Delinquency Defense in Hartford, Connecticut reported that all 
children in juvenile court proceedings are shackled and there is 
no individualized determination of danger or risk of flight.114 
Instead, the Connecticut courts allowed the judicial marshals, 
who provide courtroom security, to make determinations about 
safety risk and whether shackles were necessary.115 Further-
more, all juveniles coming from outside programs run by the 
Connecticut Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) are 
required to wear restraint belts, even those who are in secure 
holding rooms.116  
The policy reported in Louisville, Kentucky juvenile 
courts is similar to Hartford’s.117 The Chief Public Defender for 
Louisville-Jefferson County noted that all juvenile court 
defendants are required to be in handcuffs at all times while in 
the courtroom.118 There is no individualized determination of 
danger or risk of flight.119 Furthermore, defenders’ motions to 
oppose shackling are frequently denied on the grounds that the 
sheriff’s department is in charge of courtroom security, and the 
department sets the policy about shackling or otherwise 
restraining juvenile defendants.120 
In other state counties, it is common practice to shackle 
all juveniles who are “in custody,” which includes children 
detained in a local facility and children in the custody of the 
state juvenile prison.121 In these counties, the shackles are not 
  
NLADACornerstoneMartinezArticleMay-Aug2007.pdf) (citing Miami-Dade County 
Public Defenders Office survey of public defender offices throughout Florida).  
 114 E-mail from Christine Rapillo, Director of Juvenile Delinquency Defense at 
the Office of the Chief Public Defender in Hartford, Connecticut, to Bob Boruchowitz, 
Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at Seattle University Law School (Oct. 29, 2007, 7:46 
a.m.) (on file with author).  
 115 Id. Rapillo noted that last year a policy was issued requiring an 
individualized determination of danger by a judge before a child could be shackled in 
court. Id. However, she reported that this practice has stopped in favor of leaving the 
decision up to the Judicial Marshalls. Id.  
 116 Id. A restraint belt is made out of leather and has metal rings at the front. 
The strap goes around a child’s waist and the rings are connected to the handcuffs by a 
chain, thus having the effect of limiting a child’s range of movement. Complaint, Jenny 
P., supra note 1, ¶ 20.  
 117 E-mail from Daniel T. Goyette, Louisville Metro Public Defender to Bob 
Boruchowitz, Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at Seattle University Law School (Oct. 
29, 2007, 7:47 a.m.) (on file with author). 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id.  
 120 Id.  
 121 E-mail from Christina Phillis, Juvenile Division Manager of the Maricopa 
County Defenders Office to James Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender (Oct. 28, 
2007, 5:49 a.m.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Phillis e-mail]; e-mail from Kay 
Locke, Managing Attorney of the Juvenile Division of the Montgomery County Ohio 
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removed when the children are in the courtroom and before  
the judge.122 Again, public defenders note that the decision to 
leave the shackles on during court proceedings is largely based 
on recommendations from law enforcement, as opposed to 
individualized determinations by the judge.123 Moreover, when 
attorneys oppose the use of shackles, the courts rarely grant 
the motions on the grounds that there is no issue of prejudicing 
the trier of fact since there are no jury trials in these 
proceedings.124  
In contrast, some localities have been successful in 
arguing against the routine and indiscriminate use of shackles 
on juveniles. For example, in Cumberland County, Pennsyl-
vania, juveniles are not shackled unless they are “deemed to be 
a serious threat to the public.”125 If they are deemed to be a 
serious threat, the Probation Officer must seek the judge’s 
approval to shackle the juvenile.126 Juvenile defender Ron Turo 
explained “Since he instituted this policy approximately two 
years ago, we [the county] have only two to three shacklings 
out of hundreds of detained children.”127  
Florida has conducted the most recent public campaign 
against shackling juveniles.128 Over the past year, public 
  
Public Defender’s Office, to Bob Boruchowitz, Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at 
Seattle University Law School (Oct. 29, 2007, 11:14 a.m.) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Locke e-mail]. Phillis and Locke both reported this practice in their 
juvenile courts. Phillis noted that juveniles in residential treatment, as opposed to 
detention or jail, are not required to wear shackles when they appear in court. Phillis 
e-mail, supra.  
 122 Kay Locke of Montgomery County, Ohio indicated that shackles remain on 
during hearings unless the judge, in his discretion, agrees to remove them. Locke 
e-mail, supra note 121. However, it is unpredictable whether or not judges will agree to 
have shackles removed and the decision to remove shackles is not based on any 
particular criteria. Id. 
 123 Id. (indicating that judges have stated that the practice of routine 
shackling “originates from the Sheriff’s Department”). Locke further notes a pendulum 
swing effect where judges may order shackles removed once children are in the 
courtroom, but once there is an incident of running or violence by a child, every child is 
shackled for the next few months. Id. Then shackles may be removed until the next 
“incident.” Id.  
 124 Phillis e-mail, supra note 121. Phillis noted that “[o]n rare occasion[s] a 
judge may grant an oral motion to remove the shackles and handcuffs of the very 
young.” Id.  
 125 E-mail from Ron Turo, Juvenile Defender in Cumberland County 
Pennsylvania to Bob Boruchowitz, Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at Seattle 
University Law School (Oct. 29, 2007, 9:44 a.m.) (on file with author).  
 126 Id.  
 127 Id.  
 128  The Public Defender’s Office in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida has 
explicitly argued that the indiscriminate use of shackles is “inconsistent with the 
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system.” Memorandum from Marie 
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defenders in Miami have been fighting the blanket policy of 
shackling all juveniles throughout their entire court pro-
ceedings.129 The attorneys initially attempted to work with 
court administrators to end the practice.130 However, once the 
talks proved unsuccessful, they filed over one hundred motions 
in the Miami juvenile courts requesting that their clients be 
allowed to appear in court without shackles.131 Ultimately, the 
judges began hearing and granting the individual motions.132  
Additionally, in New York, the Legal Aid Society 
brought a lawsuit against the Office of Children and Family 
Services (“OCFS”) to challenge its policy of shackling all 
juveniles in its custody and requiring them to remain in 
shackles while they await their court appearance and when in 
front of the judge.133 This challenge was successful in that the 
New York Supreme Court granted a temporary restraining 
order requiring that John F. appear in court without shackles 
on December 13, 2007 or any other date on which he was to 
appear in court, unless there was an individualized assessment 
demonstrating that he posed a “serious evident danger to 
himself and others.”134 In addition, the court signed a 
stipulation and order between the Legal Aid Society and OCFS 
  
Osborne, Chief, Juvenile Div., Pub. Defender’s Office, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of 
Florida, Memorandum to Honorable Lester Langer (May 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/Appendix_B_Memo_to_Hon_Judge_Langer
_re_Shackling.pdf. 
 129 Martinez, supra note 113, at 10; see also Bennett H. Brummer et al.,  
Public Defender’s Office, Sample Motion for Child to Appear Free from Degrading  
and Unlawful Restraints, 10-16, 2006, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ 
unchainthechildren/Motion_for_Child_to_Appear_Free_from_Degrading_and_Unlawful
_Restraints.pdf (arguing that shackling is harmful to children and is contrary to the 
principles of Florida’s juvenile justice system). 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id.  
 132 See Jon Burstein, Detained Children Will Not Be Shackled in Court- 
rooms, Judges Rule, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 2006, available at http:// 
www.pdmiami.com/Detained_juveniles_will_not_be_shackled.htm. Courts in Broward 
County also ordered judges to discontinue blanket shackling policies. Nikki Waller, 
Shackling of Kids Curtailed in Broward Courtrooms, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25,  
2006, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/Herald-Shackling_of_kids_curtailed_in_ 
Broward.htm. But see Kathleen Chapman, Judges Refuse to Unshackle Juveniles, PALM 
BEACH POST, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/Palm_Beach_Post-
Judges_refuse_to_unshackle_juveniles.pdf (reporting on Palm Beach County juvenile 
judges’ refusal to remove shackles from juveniles in their courtrooms).  
 133 John F. v. Carrion, No. 07/407117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 2007). The Legal 
Aid Society is currently “engaged in expedited settlement talks” with OCFS. Telephone 
interview with Nancy Rosenbloom, Director of Special Litigation and Law Reform Unit, 
Legal Aid Society, New York City (Apr. 28, 2007).  
 134 Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restrain-
ing Order at 2, John F., No. 07/407117. 
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whereby OCFS agreed to apply any final judgment on this 
matter to all similarly situated defendants.135  
Thus, while there have been successful challenges to the 
practice of routinely shackling juveniles in court, many 
jurisdictions continue to apply blanket policies without any 
showing of need. This system is in direct conflict with the 
constitutional rule established in Deck v. Missouri136 and is also 
undermined by the existing case law on shackling children in 
juvenile court.137 The blanket policies are further discredited by 
the fact that the justifications offered for shackling juveniles do 
not rise to the level of an essential state interest and ignore the 
policy and purpose behind the juvenile justice system.  
B. Justifications Offered for Shackling Juveniles  
There are three main justifications that are routinely 
offered for the indiscriminate use of shackles on juveniles:  
(1) the need for courtroom security and the dearth of court 
resources to maintain security; (2) the lack of concern for 
prejudice because of the absence of jury trials; and (3) the 
potential for shackling to serve as a deterrent to future 
criminal conduct by detained youth.138 These justifications fail 
to demonstrate the “essential state interest” requirement 
established in Holbrook v. Flynn and reiterated in Deck.139 
Further, none of these stated justifications outweighs the 
detrimental physical and psychological harm shackling causes 
to juveniles.  
Some courts have suggested that security in the court-
room and courthouse should be considered when determining 
whether shackles are appropriate.140 One court gave deference 
  
 135 Stipulation and Order at 2, John F., No. 07/407117. 
 136 See supra Part II.C.  
 137 See infra Part V.  
 138 See In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d. 3, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (discussing jury 
prejudice), aff’d 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977); State v. Merrell, 12 P.3d 556, 559-60 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2000) (discussing lack of court resources); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of 
Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing 
jury prejudice); State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673, 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing jury 
prejudice); Martinez, supra note 113, at 11 (discussing courtroom security). 
 139 See supra Part II.B-C.  
 140 Martinez, supra note 113, at 11-12; see also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 
624 (2005) (recognizing that the need to maintain order and security may suffice as an 
“essential state interest” to justify the use of visible shackles). However, in Deck, the 
Court was talking about maintaining courtroom security “specific to the defendant on 
trial” as opposed to a general desire to maintain security. Id.; see In re R.W.S. 728 
N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 2007) (holding that the trial judge failed to properly exercise his 
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to the bailiff’s position regarding the positive impact shackling 
had on courtroom security and decorum, instead of making an 
individualized determination for the child.141 Other arguments 
focused on the notion that children are impulsive and difficult 
to control, and therefore shackling is necessary to minimize 
fights and maintain security.142  
In contrast, in Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County,143 the California Courts of Appeal expressly 
stated that the “source of the ‘need,’” to justify the use of 
shackles must come from a record of violence or threat of 
violence by the accused.144 There, the prosecution and the 
sheriff’s department’s main reasons for asserting that every 
juvenile needed to be shackled were the absence of sufficient 
security personnel and the design of the Lancaster court-
house.145 However, the California Courts of Appeal concluded 
that a lack of courtroom personnel is not a sufficient justi-
fication for requiring a juvenile to appear in shackles during  
his or her proceedings.146 This justification for courtroom 
security fails to acknowledge less restrictive means other than 
shackling that could achieve the same goal of security. 
  
discretion when a juvenile requested that his shackles be removed during an 
adjudicatory hearing). In In re R.W.S., the North Dakota Supreme Court found that a 
trial judge may not rely on conclusory statements made by law enforcement regarding 
a serious risk of dangerous behavior as a substitute for an individual analysis. Id. 
However, the court also explained that the security situation at the courtroom and 
courthouse is just one of the factors that a juvenile court should consider when 
determining whether or not to require the juvenile to appear in shackles. Id. Similarly, 
in In re Staley, the Illinois Court of Appeals also indicated that courtroom security 
could be one factor justifying the use of shackles. 352 N.E.2d. at 6. In this case, fifteen-
year-old Staley was alleged to have committed aggravated battery for his involvement 
in a fight that occurred between another youth and staff members at a detention home. 
Id. at 5. Staley challenged his delinquency adjudication on the grounds that he was 
denied a fair hearing because he had been required to appear in handcuffs throughout 
his hearing. Id.  
 141 S.Y. v. McMillan, 563 So. 2d 807, 808-09 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 142 Martinez, supra note 113, at 11. The Florida attorneys successfully 
litigated the issue, and currently over 95% of the juveniles represented in Miami 
appear without shackles in front of all four juvenile court judges. Id. at 10. Since the 
first motion filed over 3000 children have appeared in court and there have been no 
incidents of violence or escape attempts. Id.  
 143 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Here, Tiffany A. got involved in 
the California Juvenile Court system for allegedly unlawfully taking a vehicle that did 
not belong to her. Throughout the course of the case, Tiffany A. objected to the 
requirement that she appear in court in shackles. Id. at 366.  
 144 Id. at 372 (emphasis in original) (citing People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351 (Cal. 
1991) (reaffirming People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322 (Cal. 1976)).  
 145 Id. at 374.  
 146 Id. at 372 (“We note that no California State court case has enforced the 
use of physical restraints based solely on the defendants’ status in custody, the lack of 
courtroom security personnel or the inadequacy of the court facilities.”). 
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Specifically, in Holbrook v. Flynn, the Supreme Court put 
forward the option of additional armed security guards as a 
less prejudicial alternative to shackling a defendant in order to 
ensure security.147 Moreover, the absence of sufficient resources 
to address the courtroom security concerns is not an 
appropriate reason to require all children to appear shackled in 
court and does not satisfy the “essential state interest” 
requirement established in Holbrook and reiterated in Deck.148 
Another justification for blanket shackling policies is 
that juvenile proceedings do not involve a jury, so there is no 
concern that shackles will create prejudice in the fact-finder. 
The theory espoused by courts, prosecutors, and courtroom 
personnel is that because juveniles do not have the right to a 
jury trial, there is a diminished concern that shackles will 
serve to prejudice the fact-finder.149 However, since judges in 
juvenile court proceedings serve as the triers of fact, they will, 
arguably, be susceptible to prejudice, as are juries. Accordingly, 
in Tiffany A. the California Courts of Appeal held that the 
concern of prejudice is applicable even where there is no jury 
presence.150 The court distinguished on numerous grounds 
United States v. Howard,151 a Ninth Circuit decision upholding 
a district court policy to shackle all in-custody defendants 
  
 147 See supra Part II.B.  
 148 See supra Part II.C.  
 149 See, e.g., In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3, 7-8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (Stengel, J., 
dissenting); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 
857, 860-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the shackling of the defendant was 
harmless error as there was no indication “that trial court’s credibility determinations 
were impermissibly skewed” by the presence of shackles); State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673, 
679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the shackling of the defendant was harmless 
error in a bench trial in part because there was no risk of prejudice from viewing 
restraints by a jury). 
 150 Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 370-72. The court relied on both People v. 
Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302 (Cal. 1991), and Solomon v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1981), in holding that shackling is prejudicial even during a proceeding 
without a jury. Id. at 371. In both Fierro and Solomon, the courts considered the use of 
physical restraints on adult defendants during preliminary hearings where no jury was 
present. Fierro, 821 P.2d at 1321; Solomon, 177 Cal. Rptr. At 1-2. In both cases the 
courts held that the principles from People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Cal. 1976), 
holding that shackling a criminal defendant prejudicially affects the defendant’s 
constitutional right to be presumed innocent, applied to proceedings without a jury. 
Fierro, 821 P.2d at 1322; Solomon, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 3. But see United States v. 
Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that use of shackles on 
criminal defendants during pretrial hearings where no jury is present is permissible 
because there is no concern of prejudice when the defendant only appears in front of a 
judge); United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (same).  
 151 480 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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during their first appearances in front of a federal magistrate.152 
Most relevant to the jury prejudice issue, the court in Tiffany 
A. noted that Howard considered only individuals shackled for 
their first appearances.  
In contrast, Tiffany A. considered the use of shackles on 
juveniles at every appearance in the Lancaster juvenile 
delinquency court.153 Juvenile judges sit as triers of fact, 
making crucial determinations regarding a juvenile’s future. 
Among other consequences, juveniles can spend multiple years 
in detention facilities as the result of a juvenile adjudication. 
The nature of this proceeding is clearly distinguishable from a 
first appearance or arraignment in front of a magistrate judge, 
and therefore concerns about prejudice are certainly applicable, 
thus affecting the policy on shackling children in juvenile court.  
A final justification for routine shackling of juveniles is 
that shackling may serve as a deterrent for detained children. 
The theory is that upon viewing each other in shackles and 
handcuffs, children will no longer want to commit crimes so 
they can avoid being treated like they were in court.154 This 
argument strongly suggests that shackling is a deterrent 
because of its shame, humiliation, and punitive effects.155 
Juvenile defenders and scholars note that there is no evidence 
to suggest that shackling juveniles is an effective deterrent to 
juvenile crime.156 Moreover, such motives for shackling are in 
stark opposition to the goals of the juvenile justice system.157 To 
require shackling as a form of punishment in the hopes of 
deterring children from violating the law is unconscionable in 
light of the historical mission of the juvenile court system to 
provide treatment for juvenile offenders.  
  
 152 Id. at 1013-14. 
 153 Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 375; see also Millican, 906 P.2d at 861 
(DeMuniz, J., dissenting) (“[U]nnecessarily shackling children in a delinquency hearing 
is presumptively prejudicial . . . .”).  
 154 Martinez, supra note 113, at 11. 
 155 Indeed, punishment has no place in the adult criminal system prior to the 
determination of guilt. The American judicial system is predicated on a presumption of 
innocence. In Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme Court noted that the use of visible 
shackles undermines this central tenet of our justice system. 544 U.S. 622, 631 (2005). 
 156 See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 113, at 11. 
 157 See supra Part III (discussing the purpose of the juvenile justice system to 
treat and rehabilitate juveniles). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
deterrence may not have the same effect on juveniles as it has on adults. See Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“[T]he absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of 
special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable 
than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”). 
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Routine shackling goes against the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Deck that such blanket policies deny individual 
defendants of a fair trial.158 Further, the justifications offered in 
support of routinely shackling children in court fall short of 
meeting an “essential state interest.”159 Despite the absence of a 
jury, the judge may still be susceptible to prejudice from 
stigma-laden shackles. Further, in McKeiver, juveniles were 
denied the right to a jury trial under the premise that the 
juvenile court system would be rehabilitative and less formal 
and adversarial.160 To now justify a punitive measure such  
as shackling because there is no concern for jury prejudice 
belies the reasoning behind McKeiver and unfairly uses this 
procedural denial against children.  
C. How Shackling Harms Children 
It seems axiomatic that the use of shackles does not 
serve a treatment or rehabilitative purpose.161 In fact, it is 
generally accepted that shackling children causes both physical 
and psychological harm.162 However, there is a general silence 
about the practice of routinely shackling children throughout 
their juvenile court appearances in both case law and scholarly 
work.163 Therefore the research discussed in this section  
about the negative effects of shackling children comes from 
professionals who study the use of restraints on children in 
juvenile justice facilities and psychiatric treatment centers.  
While the Supreme Court in Deck acknowledged that 
the issue of physical harm with shackles may no longer be a 
relevant concern for adults,164 the potential for physical harm is 
still a pressing concern with respect to children. Shackling can 
cause physical harm: children who have been required to wear 
shackles complain of bruising, cuts, and pain around their 
  
 158 Deck, 544 U.S. at 624. 
 159 Id. at 628-29.  
 160 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1971). 
 161 See supra Part IV.B (discussing the justifications for shackling juveniles).  
 162 See infra Part IV.C.  
 163 See infra Part V.A (discussing case law acknowledging the negative effects 
of shackling on juveniles); John William Tobin, Time to Remove the Shackles: The 
Legality of Restraints on Children Deprived of Their Liberty Under International Law, 
9 INT’L J. OF CHILD. RTS. 213, 213, 221 (2001) (arguing that the use of shackles on 
children is “barbaric” and deprives them of due process rights, and specifically that 
children should only appear in court in restraints in “exceptional circumstances”).  
 164 See supra Part II.C. 
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wrists and ankles.165 Moreover, because young people are going 
through a critical time in their physical development, experts 
caution that personnel must take caution to avoid damaging 
children’s growth plates.166 But, even if a gentler type of shackle 
could be developed that could lessen the pain and the potential 
for physical damage, there are other compelling reasons to 
severely limit the use of shackles on children, namely, the 
traumatic and psychological impact it has on young people.  
Indeed, it is generally accepted by medical and mental 
health professionals that shackling and physical restraints 
should only be used on juveniles as a last resort.167 The 
American Psychiatric Association advises that even when 
restraints are needed to protect a child, staff should continue to 
work with the young person to assess the underlying issues 
resulting in the poor behavior.168 Further, children in the 
juvenile justice system have a high prevalence of psychiatric 
disorders.169 In particular, girls have extraordinarily high 
incidents of having experienced physical and sexual abuse.170 
Accordingly, experts suggest that the use of restraints may  
be “retraumatizing” for young people who have experienced 
violence or trauma in their lives or are going through stressful 
experiences.171 Moreover, the National Center for Mental 
  
 165 See Complaint, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 15, 20. 
 166 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRECTORS 
MEDICAL DIRECTORS COUNCIL, REDUCING THE USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT  
PART II 8 (2001), available at http://www.nasmhpd.org/general_files/publications/ 
med_directors_pubs/Seclusion_Restraint_2.pdf; see also Brummer et al., supra note 
129, app. F ¶ 12 (Aug. 28, 2006) (affidavit describing physical harm that shack- 
ling causes children), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/ 
AppendixFDrGwen%20Wurm.pdf. 
 167 See, e.g., id.; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE USE OF RESTRAINT 
AND SECLUSION IN CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH CARE 4 (2006), available at 
http://archive.psych.org/edu/other_res/lib_archives/archives/200605.pdf.; Howard Bath, 
The Physical Restraint of Children: Is It Therapeutic?, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 40, 
41, 48 (1994); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
CUSTODY AND CONTROL: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK’S JUVENILE 
PRISONS FOR GIRLS 45-46 (2006) [hereinafter CUSTODY AND CONTROL], available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/us0906/. 
 168 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 167, at 4 (“[R]estraint for 
protective reasons . . . does not take the place of efforts to understand and address the 
causes of the aberrant behavior. In most uses of . . . restraint, the staff should have 
considered or tried less restrictive means of control . . . .”). 
 169 LINDA A. TEPLIN ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS OF 
YOUTH IN DETENTION 2 (2006), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/210331.pdf.  
 170 CUSTODY AND CONTROL, supra note 167, at 4-5.  
 171  Julian D. Ford et al., Trauma and Youth in the Juvenile Justice System: 
Critical Issues and New Directions, NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND 
JUVENILE JUSTICE RESEARCH AND PROGRAM BRIEF, June 2007, at 1, 3; see also 
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Health and Juvenile Justice (“NCMHJJ”) cautions that 
“traumatic stress symptoms may worsen as a result of juvenile 
justice system involvement.”172 The NCMHJJ further notes that 
“[c]ourt hearings, detention, and incarceration are inherently 
stressful, and stressful experiences that are not traumatic per 
se can exacerbate trauma symptoms.”173 Thus, children in the 
juvenile justice system are particularly vulnerable. The 
imposition of shackles on a young person may exacerbate 
feelings of isolation and hopelessness, thereby frustrating the 
purpose of the juvenile justice system.  
Given the awareness about the negative impacts of 
shackling, the Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators 
(“CJCA”) adheres to specific guidelines for determining when 
the use of physical restraints on juvenile offenders is appro-
priate.174 These guidelines emphasize the limited situations 
when physical restraints might be appropriate, the types of 
personnel who should apply restraints on children, the 
duration for which restraints should be used, and appropriate 
follow-up care.175 Further, these statements suggest that the 
  
Brummer et al., supra note 129, app. D ¶ 18 (Aug. 23, 2006) (affidavit discussing 
traumatic impact of shackling on children who have been abused), available at 
http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/AppendixDBeyer.pdf. 
 172 Id. at 3. 
 173 Id. 
 174 The CJCA is a national not-for-profit organization whose mission, in part, 
is to “improve local juvenile correctional services, programs, and practices.” 
http://cjca.net/AboutUs.aspx?~SUQ9ZjRhMjhmMDUtNTM2OS00OGMzLTlhNDAtZTE
zOTNkYjQ1MzVk. See Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, Position Paper 
on Physical and Mechanical Interventions with Juvenile Offenders (2003), available at 
http://cjca.net/photos/content/documents/Interventions.pdf.  
 175 The five CJCA guidelines are:  
1. Use of physical interventions or restraints is a last resort and should 
always follow the prudent preventative use of screening, classification and 
programmatic interventions; 
2. Physical intervention and/or restraints should only be deployed when de-
escalation of the crisis has failed and the need to protect staff, other youths or 
the jurisdiction’s property is necessary; 
3. At such time that those preventive measures fail, physical interventions 
and restraints should only be done by trained individuals and only used 
defensively and in a manner that provides maximum safety for the staff and 
youths; 
4. Use of physical or other intrusive intervention methods should only 
continue as long as the youth presents a danger to self, other or property; 
5. Medical, mental health and /or administrative case reviews of 
interventions deployed should be apart of the quality assurance process and 
required.  
Id. 
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use of physical restraints and shackles on children is not to be 
taken lightly. Restraints are dangerous and may have serious 
traumatic effects on a child. Therefore, they should not be used 
routinely and indiscriminately as a stopgap measure to ensure 
safety in an aging courtroom or to prevent the potential for 
unruly behavior where no indication of the potential for such 
behavior is present.  
Beyond the physical and psychological trauma caused 
by shackles, requiring juveniles to appear in court with visible 
shackles is an affront to their moral identity and sense of self. 
Children and adolescents are in a particularly fragile state of 
development.176 Many young people struggle with their self-
image and feelings of insecurity. Exacerbating these feelings of 
uncertainty, visible shackles cause embarrassment and 
shame.177 Moreover, they brand juveniles as violent and 
dangerous criminals. These negative messages are not only 
hurtful; they contravene the values the juvenile justice system 
is supposed to present.  
Finally, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) publica-
tion on juvenile justice standards does not discuss the use of 
visible shackles on juveniles in court, and instead focuses on 
how juvenile detention facilities should be designed in order  
to foster rehabilitation.178 This logical disconnect between 
treatment outside of the system and shackling in court is 
  
 176 See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968) 
(describing the stages of identity development that adolescents experience). Recently, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of capital punishment on individuals 
under age eighteen was prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). In so doing, the Court recognized that children 
are developmentally and emotionally different from adults, less responsible for their 
actions and more capable of change. Id. at 569-70. The Court noted that there are three 
main differences between juveniles under 18 and adults. Id. at 569. First, juveniles are 
less mature and have an “underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” id. (quoting Johnson 
v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); second, juveniles are “more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” id. 
(citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)); and, third, the “character of a 
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are 
more transitory, less fixed,” id. at 570. 
 177 See, e.g., Complaint, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 10, 18. 
 178 See generally INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH 
(Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., ed., 1996) [hereinafter STANDARDS]. In a section entitled 
“Corrections,” the Standards briefly mention “restraints” when addressing residential 
programs. Id. at 52. Section 7.8 addresses limitations on restraints and weapons. Id. 
“Given the small size of programs, it should not be necessary to use mechanical 
restraints within the facility. The program director may authorize the use of 
mechanical restraints during transportation only.” Andrew Rutherford & Fred Cohen, 
Standards Relating to Corrections Administration, in STANDARDS, supra, at 29, 52. 
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another type of psychological effect of shackling on children. It 
is confusing and illogical to treat children punitively when they 
are going through courtroom proceedings and then establish 
firm guidelines to ensure a therapeutic environment once the 
youngsters are adjudicated.  
The ABA standards spend considerable time detailing 
the architectural and interior design of juvenile facilities  
and the types of values the designs should promote.179 The 
standards discuss a range of facilities from secure corrections 
and detention facilities, to group home and residential treat-
ment centers.180 In general, the Standards guide facilities to 
promote “normalization.”181 They emphasize that while children 
are going through the juvenile court system, juvenile facilities 
do not need to reinforce a notion of criminality. Further, even 
regarding secure detention facilities, the Standards implore 
that these facilities should “provide a pleasant environment.”182 
Thus, the ABA recommends that the juvenile justice system 
resemble a treatment setting, as opposed to a prison. The 
atmosphere should be calming and “normalizing” rather than 
promote a feeling of deviance or isolation in the children. 
Requiring children to routinely appear shackled in court makes 
no sense given these standards.  
The general silence on the issue of shackling children in 
court does not suggest that the practice is inconsequential. 
Rather, it demonstrates that most professionals are focused  
on the post-adjudicative or disposition183 phase of a child’s 
experience in juvenile court. Perhaps the emphasis has been on 
this phase because judges and scholars are trying to ensure 
  
 179 See Allen M. Greenberger, Standards Relating to Architecture of Facilities, 
in STANDARDS, supra note 178, at 19, 21.  
 180 Id. at 20. 
 181 Id. at 21. “Normalization” is defined as “[e]nabling juveniles within the 
juvenile justice system to project an image that does not mark them as deviant.” Id.  
at 19.  
 182 Id. at 27. A secure detention facility is designed to house accused juveniles 
and to prevent them from leaving at will. Id. at 25. Each state has different policies on 
when a child will be required to reside in a secure detention facility. As opposed to 
secure detention, many juveniles remain in the community in their homes and are 
expected to report to court with a parent or guardian for each appearance. Those 
juveniles who are dangerous, do not comply with court orders, or are at risk of flight, 
may be required by the judge to stay in a detention facility during the adjudication 
process.  
 183 In juvenile court the terms “adjudication” and “disposition” are substituted 
for “conviction” and “sentence.” This shift in language underscores the intended 
differences between juvenile court and the adult system. Children in the juvenile court 
system are not actually being convicted of a crime or sentenced to punishment.  
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that the time children spend in treatment facilities or detention 
centers does, in fact, result in treatment and, moreover, does 
not actually cause harm.184 However, it is fundamentally 
inconsistent to treat children punitively when they are going 
through the adjudication process and then provide treatment 
and rehabilitation once they leave the courtroom. It makes 
little sense to leave children physically and psychologically 
bruised during their courtroom appearances and then deliver 
them to an array of social services design to “rehabilitate” 
them. If the juvenile justice system is premised on providing 
treatment services for children, that treatment must begin 
when children enter the courthouse.185 The justifications of 
courtroom security and lack of prejudicial effect pale in 
comparison to the compelling research regarding the deleter-
ious effects of shackling on children. Moreover, the ABA 
Standards, which provide that juvenile justice facilities should 
further a sense of normalization as opposed to deviance, 
further bolster the argument that shackling children in court 
contravenes the goals of the juvenile justice system. 
D.  Children and the Right to Treatment 
Courts have recognized that once adjudicated as delin-
quent, juveniles have a constitutional “right to treatment,” 
which includes the right to freedom from unreasonable bodily 
restraint.186 However, the routine and indiscriminate use of 
  
 184 A thorough examination of conditions of confinement in youth facilities is 
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally CUSTODY AND CONTROL, supra note 167 
(discussing the conditions in two New York State institutions where female juvenile 
delinquents are confined).  
 185 On the other hand, it can also be argued that indiscriminate shackling 
violates a juvenile’s due process rights. Although the juvenile justice system is 
supposed to be therapeutic, the Supreme Court provided juveniles with certain due 
process rights to ensure that they were not taken advantage of by the system and still 
had the opportunity for a fair trial. See supra Part III.B. The Supreme Court has 
established that indiscriminate use of visible shackles violates a defendant’s right to a 
fair trial and numerous juvenile courts have followed suit, applying the standard to the 
juvenile court system. See supra Part II and infra Part V.  
 186 See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 797-98 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)). The right to treatment developed in the 
context of individuals who have been involuntarily committed for mental health 
treatment, but courts apply this right with full force to delinquent juveniles. See 
Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that juveniles do 
not have a constitutional right to “rehabilitative training” but relying on Youngberg to 
find that juveniles do “have a due process interest in freedom from unnecessary bodily 
restraint which entitles them to closer scrutiny of their conditions of confinement than 
that accorded convicted criminals”); see also Jackson v. Johnson, 118 F. Supp 2d 278, 
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shackles on children demonstrates that young people do not 
enjoy a right to treatment during their court proceedings. The 
legal right to treatment serves as another reason why the 
practice of shackling children in court is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the goals of the juvenile justice system.  
Since juveniles, even when adjudicated as delinquents, 
are not really convicted of crimes, once a young person is 
adjudicated delinquent and sent to a facility, “restrictions on [a 
juvenile’s] liberty . . . must be reasonably related to some 
legitimate government objective—of rehabilitation, safety or 
internal order and security.”187 This means that a juvenile may 
not be placed in confinement or subjected to mechanical 
restraints of any form without a determination that these 
restrictions serve the rehabilitative needs of the child. 
Moreover, even when a restriction of liberty is based on “safety 
or internal order and security,” it cannot be an arbitrary or 
indiscriminate practice.188 Rather, facility officials must 
demonstrate that they have tried less restrictive means, and 
have no alternative but to employ restraints.189  
For example, Pena v. New York State Division for Youth, 
the first New York case to address the issue of shackling 
juveniles in treatment facilities, established the standard in 
New York that unless absolutely necessary, shackling is 
antithetical to the goals and objectives of the juvenile justice 
system.190 In that case, the Southern District of New York 
explicitly stated that the physical restraints were “highly anti-
therapeutic.”191 Moreover, the court recalled that when the 
  
289 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in part, 13 Fed. Appx. 51 (2d Cir. 2001); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 
F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (N.D. Ill. 1989).  
 187 Collazo, 714 F.2d at 1180.  
 188 Id.  
 189 See id. at 1181.  
 190 Pena v. N.Y. State Division for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976). This case involved the use of shackles on children placed at Goshen, a 
residential facility for boys adjudicated as delinquents. See id. at 204. The court held 
that the New York State Division for Youth may not use shackles or restraints without 
an individualized determination of danger. Id. at 211. This rule is codified in the new 
York Code, which states “Physical restraints . . . shall be used only in cases where a 
child is uncontrollable and constitutes a serious and evident danger to himself or 
others.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 168.3(a). 
 191 Pena, 419 F. Supp. at 211. The court did not fully prohibit the use of 
shackles, but made clear that shackles should only be used when necessary and that 
there must always be an individualized determination of need. The court was 
specifically referring to the facility practice of binding boys’ hands and feet with 
handcuffs and plastic straps and then leaving them on the floor for hours at a time. 
Moreover boys were also bound to furniture. While the use of restraints and shackles in 
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United States Supreme Court decided to deprive juveniles of 
the full panoply of procedural rights, they “made it clear that 
the constitutional justification for this procedural deprivation 
is the parens patriae underpinning of the juvenile justice 
system and its absolute proscription against punishment and 
retribution as permissible objectives.”192 Accordingly, juveniles 
have a right to rehabilitative treatment that is violated when 
the juvenile justice system employs methods that are anti-
therapeutic and punitive.193  
Unfortunately, the legal analysis underpinning a child’s 
right to treatment once she has been adjudicated delinquent 
has not translated into a similar right during courtroom 
proceedings. Clearly, the indiscriminate use of shackles on 
children while they appear in court is anti-therapeutic. The 
right to treatment should be enjoyed when children enter the 
court system, and the same standard that prohibits arbitrary 
use of restraints on children in treatment settings should 
govern the use of shackles in court. Beyond this basic 
inconsistency, when juveniles wait for hours in shackles for 
their court appearances with no determination having been 
made that the child is violent or dangerous, they may become 
confused. Children may understand that their out-of-control 
behavior in a facility has a consequence and may result in  
the use of restraints. However, in court, if without acting 
inappropriately they are still restrained, children will not 
understand why they are being punished.  
Thus, some courts have established that the use of 
shackling violates the goals of the juvenile justice system, or at 
the very least is intrusive of juveniles’ liberty, and should 
  
confinement is beyond the scope of this Note, Pena is still illustrative of an early court 
acknowledging that use of shackles can be “anti-therapeutic” and punitive. Id. 
 192 Pena, 419 F. Supp. at 206.  
 193 Id. (citing numerous cases for the proposition that juveniles have right to 
rehabilitative treatment). See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 175 (E.D. 
Tex. 1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of 
Boys Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D.R.I. 1972); Nelson v. 
Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 459 (N.D. Ind. 1972). The court reasoned that that the right 
to treatment proscribes any detention of youth in a juvenile justice system that does 
not provide for rehabilitative treatment. In concluding that the use of shackles and 
restraints in the manner prescribed in this case was anti-therapeutic and punitive,  
the court held that the practice violated the youths’ due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Pena, 419 F. Supp. at 207. This Note argues that similar to 
detention, the repeated use of shackling juveniles during court proceedings is also anti-
therapeutic and violates children’s rights to rehabilitation and treatment- the primary 
objective of the juvenile justice system.  
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therefore not be imposed arbitrarily.194 Given this acknowl-
edgment, combined with research demonstrating the harmful 
effects of shackling on juveniles and the lack of sufficient 
justifications to outweigh these harmful effects, the current 
widespread practice of shackling children in court makes a 
mockery of the goals of the juvenile justice system.  
V. TOWARD A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SHACKLING JUVENILES 
THAT REFLECTS THE PURPOSE OF THE JUVENILE  
COURT SYSTEM 
Shackling is a harmful practice that undermines the 
goals of the juvenile justice system and causes serious harm to 
children. This premise is not controversial among juvenile 
justice scholars and practitioners, yet the practice persists.195 
Evidence demonstrates that shackling juveniles causes both 
physical and psychological damage and that children in the 
juvenile justice system are particularly vulnerable.196 It is 
axiomatic that children are developmentally different from 
adults. Yet, juvenile courts often limit their analysis of 
shackling to the framework used in non-juvenile proceedings. 
That is, shackles are prejudicial when they are visible to juries, 
and since there are no juries in juvenile court, there is no 
prejudicial effect.197 However, courts should focus on the unique 
impact shackling has on children and how it controverts the 
purposes of the juvenile justice system.  
  
 194 Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 375 (Cal. App. 2007) 
(holding that shackling without an individualized determination of need conflicts with 
the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court system); State v. Merrell, 12 P.3d 556, 558 
(Or. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the use of shackles must be justified by a 
determination that the defendant poses an immediate risk of danger or potential for 
escape); In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (requiring the state to show a 
“good reason” in order to justify use of shackles), aff’d, 364 N.E.2d 72. 
 195 See supra Part IV.A. 
 196 See supra Part IV.C. 
 197 See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626, 632 (2005) (holding visible 
shackles are prejudicial to criminal defendants and thus are prohibited during the 
capital sentencing phase as well as the guilt phase absent an essential state purpose). 
As discussed in Part II, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court has cited two other primary 
concerns regarding visible shackles: impairing communication between the defendant 
and his attorney, and degrading the dignity and decorum of the courtroom. While the 
few juvenile courts that have addressed the issue of visible shackles have acknowl-
edged these other two arguments, the absence of jury prejudice has led some judges to 
conclude that any error was harmless. See, e.g., State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of 
Multonomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Or. App. 1995); State v. E.J.Y., 
55 P.3d 673, 679 (Wash. App. 2002).  
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A.  The Legal Standard for Juveniles 
Most of the case law on the use of shackles in courts 
involves the adult criminal justice system as opposed to the 
juvenile court system.198 Some states, however, have addressed 
the routine use of shackles on youth in juvenile court 
proceedings.199 The states that have addressed the issue of 
shackles in juvenile court proceedings primarily echo the 
general principle that has been applied in the adult court 
system: shackles should not be required unless there is an 
individualized determination of need.200 The opinions indicate 
that while juvenile court proceedings may not have the same 
concern regarding the prejudicial effect of shackles in front of a 
jury, other concerns emphasized in Deck are still relevant.201 
These courts relied on the same reasoning as the United States 
Supreme Court in Deck—that shackles affect the ability to be 
present and participate in one’s defense, are an affront to 
human dignity and to the dignity of the courtroom, and impair 
one’s ability to communicate with counsel.202 However, in 
  
 198 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 32, at 17 (discussing several state cases 
recognizing as a general rule an accused’s right to appear at trial free of shackles). 
 199 California, Oregon, Illinois, Washing, North Dakota, and Florida have case 
law on the issue of shackling juveniles during juvenile court proceedings. See, e.g., 
Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Ct. App. 2007); S.Y. 
v. McMillan, 563 So. 2d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977); In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 2007); 
State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1995); State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). There is more case law 
on the use of physical restraints during confinement either in a juvenile detention 
facility or residential treatment center. See, e.g., Pena, 419 F. Supp. at 207; Martarella, 
349 F. Supp. at 583.  
 200 Courts vary on what factors should be considered for determining need. See 
Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); In 
re Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a lesser 
showing of need is required for shackling a juvenile during a jurisdictional hearing in a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding compared to a jury trial). In Tiffany A., the court found 
that two main principles from Deshaun M. should be considered when determining if 
shackling juveniles is necessary: (1) the type of proceeding determines the showing 
required to justify shackling (e.g., a jury trial requires a greater showing than a bench 
trial) and (2) the reason for the need of shackling must be a record of violence or a 
threat of violence by the accused. Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 372. The court 
expressly stated that lack of courtroom personnel is not a sufficient reason for a 
showing of need. Id. at 373. But see In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 2007) 
(finding that the security situation of the courtroom and courthouse is one of the 
factors to consider). 
 201 See, e.g., Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 366; Staley, 352 N.E.2d. at 5; 
Millican, 906 P.2d at 860. 
 202 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005); Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr.3d at 
366; Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 629-30; Staley, 352 N.E.2d at 5-6; R.W.S., 728 
N.W.2d at 330; Millican, 906 P.2d at 860.  
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addition, many courts then assert that since juveniles do not 
have a right to a jury trial, there is no possibility for jury 
prejudice. Thus, the analysis results in the conclusion that that 
failure to make an individualized determination of need is 
harmless error.203  
Although there may be a diminished concern for pre-
judice in juvenile court, there are other concerns, primarily  
the conflict with the goals of the juvenile justice system. The 
absence of a strong concern for jury prejudice should not leave 
the door open for courts to justify shackling children when it  
is well-documented that the practice is physically and psycho-
logically damaging to children.  
The opinion in Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County is a model for a legal analysis of shackling 
juveniles that reflects both the distinct needs of children and 
the objectives of the juvenile justice system.204 In that case, the 
California Superior Court held that shackling without an 
individualized determination of need was unlawful not only 
because it violated the principles from Deck, but also because 
the use of shackles was contrary to the principles of the 
juvenile justice system.205 The court noted that “[t]he objectives 
of the juvenile justice system differ from those of the adult . . . 
system, and thus justify a less punitive approach to those who 
stand accused . . . before the court.”206 Therefore, while some 
courts have concluded that adult defendants do not have the 
right to appear unshackled when there is no jury present, 
Tiffany A. stands for the proposition that there are other 
considerations besides the prejudicial effect of shackles that 
demand restricting its use.207 Indeed the court emphatically 
stated:  
  
 203 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
 204 See Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Ct. 
App. 2007).  
 205 Id. at 374-75.  
 206 Id. The court distinguished Howard on a number of different grounds. 
First they noted that an individualized security assessment may not have been possible 
for each defendant prior to his or her initial appearance, second Howard only concerns 
first appearances where as the instant case concerned the use of shackles at each 
appearance, and third Howard involved proceedings with multiple defendants. Id. at 
374.  
 207 The Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have both held that 
visible shackles worn in front of a magistrate judge, who will not make the ultimate 
determination of the defendant’s guilt, do not offend the principles from Deck. See 
United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997). The court in Tiffany A. distinguished Howard, 
in which the Ninth Circuit held that a district-wide policy to shackle all adult in-
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[T]he rationale of the California cases—that the Constitution does 
not require juveniles to have the full complement of rights afforded 
adult defendants because to do so would introduce a tone of 
criminality into juvenile proceedings—would not be served by 
requiring all juveniles, irrespective of the charges against them, or 
their conduct in custody, to wear shackles during all court 
proceedings.208 
Similarly, in Juvenile Department of Multnomah County 
v. Millican, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the 
adult standards for shackling must apply to juveniles.209 
However, they held that the error in this case was harmless 
because there was no evidence of prejudice or indication that 
the shackles “adversely affected the child’s decision to testify,” 
noting that he did so “without any suggestion of discomfort or 
reluctance.”210 In dissent, Judge De Muniz argued that the error 
was not harmless. He focused his argument on the distinct 
characteristics of juveniles. In addition to the factors from 
State v. Kessler,211 the prevailing case in Oregon on standards 
for applying shackles on adult criminal defendants, he 
suggested the court should consider the “potentially prejudicial 
effect on a child’s ability to testify, because shackling is likely 
to be more psychologically jarring for children than adults.”212  
Dissenting Judge De Muniz properly noted that 
shackles may “undermine a child’s confidence in telling his side 
of the story, which would adversely affect the credibility 
determination of even the most experienced juvenile judge.”213 
Moreover, he asserted that shackling children without a record 
of individualized need “not only violates the protections 
afforded adults, it also thwarts the historical purpose of 
Oregon’s juvenile justice system.”214 This type of analysis 
recasts the issue into one about the distinct nature of juveniles 
and recalls the premise of the juvenile justice system. In order 
for the insidious practice of shackling juveniles to end, courts 
must see beyond the rule set forth in Deck and challenge the 
  
custody defendants for their first appearances before the federal magistrate did not 
violate constitutional rights. Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 374-75.  
 208 Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr.3d at 375. 
 209 State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 
857, 860 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 
 210 Id. at 861. 
 211 645 P.2d 1070 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).  
 212 Millican, 906 P.2d at 861. 
 213 Id. at 861.  
 214 Id. at 862.  
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practice on the grounds that it violates the principles of the 
juvenile justice system.  
B. The Court as a “Locus for Education”  
If the obvious harms that result from shackling children 
are not enough, there is another reason to end this insidious 
practice. Time spent within the juvenile court system should be 
an opportunity for children to learn powerful lessons about 
fairness, equality, and justice—three pillars of our democracy. 
Historically, the court was seen as a place for ongoing 
education of the child.215 As one scholar remarked, the juvenile 
court was “a locus for education and an instrument of social 
instruction in the path to citizenship . . . . The school and court 
are bound in an intricate public mission: to teach, to care for, to 
sanction the young.”216 Children are in an ongoing process of 
learning, and much of what they learn is by example.217 
Furthermore, research suggests that when children believe a 
law is legitimate they are more likely to comply with it.218 
Courtroom policies that require the routine use of shackles on 
juveniles are arbitrary and reinforce in children the notion that 
our justice system is unfair and inequitable.  
Shackles are a mark of guilt and are utterly dehuman-
izing. Indeed, shackles conjure the image of a caged animal. If 
we want to teach children and youth to respect people, to make 
  
 215 Bernardine Dohrn, The School, the Child, and the Court, in A CENTURY OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 267, 267-69 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002). Dohrn notes 
that the school and the court were historically intertwined. Id. at 267. The first 
juvenile court coincided with social movements around public education for children. 
Id. Although not directly relevant to the arguments in this Note, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s analysis of children’s free speech rights in school in the landmark case Tinker 
v. Des Moines School District serves as an analogy for understanding the argument 
against blanket shackling policies. In Tinker, the Court held that children had free-
speech rights in school that were not necessarily subsidiary to the authority of school 
officials. 393, U.S. 503, 508 (1968). The Court emphatically stated that the mere 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the 
right to freedom of expression.” Id. Similarly, “mere undifferentiated fear” should not 
be sufficient to justify the wholesale shackling of children in the juvenile court system.  
 216 Id. at 268-69. A detailed discussion of the interplay between the school and 
the court is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the author points out that the 
pedagogical stance of the early juvenile court often preached racial superiority and a 
rigid formulation of appropriate behavior and cultural norms. Id. at 304. This Note 
draws on the analogy between schools and courts only to argue that courts can be seen 
as an outlet for teaching democratic ideals. And, to the extent that the court may serve 
this purpose, shackling stands in contrast to such values.  
 217 See ZIMRING, supra note 82, at 17. 
 218 Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and 
Adolescents, SOCIAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, Sept. 2005, at 217, 236. 
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independent choices instead of succumbing to peer-pressure, 
and to think cautiously and astutely before they act, then the 
court system should serve as a model for such values.219 
Instead, by routinely shackling young people, without exer-
cising any individual judgment, the court sends a contradictory 
message to children and youth—one that suggests that 
independent judgment is not in fact valued. Further, shackling 
is a violent practice and gives the message that the court will 
treat suspected violence with violence. This eye-for-an-eye type 
of message does little to educate young people about respect 
and trust. Moreover, it certainly does not leave children with 
any reason to have faith in the system that is judging them. 
Just as children’s rights do not stop at the school house door, 
rights for young people do not stop at the courtroom door.220  
Ending the practice of shackling does not have to result 
in sacrificing important values, such as promoting safe courts 
and communities, and ensuring young people are made aware 
of the consequences of their actions. As former New York 
Supreme Court Judge Michael Corriero221 has noted, “Focusing 
on the best interests of the child . . . does not mean circum-
venting the best interests of society. The two interests are, for 
the most part, coextensive. What’s good for the child in a 
democratic society is good for society as a whole.”222 Society 
benefits when we treat children fairly by limiting the use of 
dehumanizing shackles to only those individuals that otherwise 
absolutely cannot be controlled. All of the children who enter 
the juvenile justice system will eventually return to society. 
Society will benefit from children who come back to their 
communities without the scars of shackling. The imprint left on 
the mind when a young person who is required to appear in 
court in shackles, in front of family and community members, 
may leave us with a child who is forever scarred. It is time to 
remove the chains and return to the rehabilitative goals of the 
  
 219 See ZIMRING, supra note 82, at 17-22 (arguing that modern adolescence is 
akin to a “learner’s permit” whereby children are constantly learning behaviors and 
much of what they learn is from following examples). 
 220 See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503-05 (1969). Rights for 
juveniles do not stop at the courthouse door, except for those rights that are 
inconsistent with the status of being a juvenile. See supra Part III.B.  
 221 Judge Corriero was the presiding judge of the Manhattan Criminal Court 
Youth Part from 1992 to 2006. CORRIERO, supra note 108, at vii. He heard cases 
involving 13, 14 and 15 year olds who were being tried as adults pursuant to New 
York’s Juvenile Offender Law. Id. at 7. 
 222 Id. at 6.  
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juvenile justice system. Then, perhaps, the courtroom may 
return as a “locus for education.”223  
CONCLUSION 
Shackling is a physically and psychologically damaging 
practice that contravenes the ultimate goal of the juvenile 
justice system: to rehabilitate children. Criminal defendants in 
the adult system enjoy the right to appear in court free from 
visible shackles.224 Many juveniles, however, still suffer under 
blanket policies requiring the routine use of shackles without 
an individualized determination of need.225 When juvenile 
courts require children to appear in court shackled, the 
message young people learn is that they are violent, dangerous 
criminals. This practice is inconsistent with juveniles’ right to 
treatment and has the effect of actually harming children. 
Jenny P. and the thousands of other children who go through 
the juvenile justice system in America are in that system 
because our society believes they should be given an oppor-
tunity to learn from their mistakes, change their behaviors, 
and receive services to assist them in realizing their full 
potential. Juvenile courts should end the routine practice of 




 223 See supra Part V.B. 
 224 See supra Part II.  
 225 See supra Part IV.A.  
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